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ABRAHAM LINCOLN: CENTRALIZING CLASS WARRIOR 
 




Abraham Lincoln was the great centralizer. His War of 1861 was only the tip of the iceberg 
in this regard. This core of his philosophy can also be seen in his “contributions” to class warfare, the 
American “system” of public works, strong tariff protection, public lands policy, welfare payments to 
large corporate interests, and in the contrasts between the Confederate and the U.S. Constitutions. 
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Abraham Lincoln is most famous for suppressing Southern Secession. But this 
in turn has suppressed appreciation for this contribution to several other aspects of 
American society. To wit, his championing of class warfare (section II), his support 
for  corporate welfare  (section  III)  and  his  use  of public  lands  policy  to  support 
centralization (section IV). In order to more starkly analyze his “contribution” to 
U.S. political economy, we also compare and contrast in section V the Confederate 
Constitution to that of the victors of the War Between the States. We conclude in 
section VI. 
 
2. Class warrior 
 
DiLorenzo (1998, 244) made a strong case against Lincoln as, “…the Great 
Centralizer, whose policies did much to undermine the decentralized, federal system 
established by the Founders.”  We contend that Lincoln was a “Class Warrior,” or, at 
the very least, his principles did not prevent him from stooping to engage in class 
warfare to achieve his political and economic ends.  And class warfare is a way of life 
of  centralizers  and  their  systems.    Lincoln  was  a  precursor  of  every  American 
centralizer of the late 19
th and 20
th centuries, including, notably, Franklin Delano 
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Roosevelt.  Certainly, class warfare was a feature of the New Deal, America’s greatest 
centralization  effort  of  the  20th  century,  and  FDR,  the  leader  thereof,  routinely 
engaged in class warfare, as have other, lesser American centralizers of the late 19
th 
and 20th centuries.
1   
The following two (2) quotes from an “Address to the People of Illinois” signed 
by A. Lincoln, S. T. Logan, and A. T. Bledsoe as printed in a “Campaign Circular 
from Whig Committee” of March 4, 1843, are illustrative of Lincoln’s class warfare.   
“And again, by the tariff system, the whole revenue is paid by the consumers of 
foreign goods, and those chiefly, the luxuries, and not the necessaries of life.  By this 
system, the man who contents himself to live upon the products of his own country, 
pays nothing at all. And surely, that country is extensive enough, and its products 
abundant and varied enough, to answer all the real wants of its people.  In short, by 
this system, the burthen of revenue falls almost entirely on the wealthy and luxurious 
few, while the substantial and laboring many who live at home, and upon home 
products, go entirely free” (Basler 1953, 311). 
 “One [reason given against Clay’s land bill] is, that by giving [the states] the 
proceeds of the public lands, we impoverish the National Treasury,
2 and thereby 
render necessary an increase in the tariff.  This may be true, but if so, the amount of 
it only is, that those whose pride, whose abundance of means, prompt them to spurn 
the manufactures of their own country, and to strut in British cloaks, and coats, and 
pantaloons, may have to pay a few cents more on the yard for the cloth that makes 
them.  A terrible evil, truly, to the Illinois farmer, who never wore, nor never [sic] 
expects to wear, a single yard of British goods in his whole life” (Basler 1953, 313, 
footnote added).  
FDR  (http://www.knowprose.com/node/12218)  learned  well  the  lesson  of 
class  warfare  at  his  predecessor’s  knee.  He  is  responsible  for  the  following 
statements:  
“We know now that Government by organized money is just as dangerous as 
Government by organized mob.... [The organized moneyed people] are unanimous in 
their hate for me and I welcome their hatred.... I should like to have it said of my.... 
administration that these forces met their master.” 
“The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of 
those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too 
little.” 
Popular opinion usually “credits” Marx (1848) as the creator of class warfare. 
And, indeed, there is some justification for such a claim, for he makes it very clearly: 
"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." 
                                                 
1 And, of course, class warfare is of the essence of Communism, and was an very important element in 
Naziism’s ascent to power, witness the Nazi Party Brownshirts.  Certainly, in the 20th Century, we 
have seen all of the great centralizers, whether of the more virulent or less virulent stripe, employ class 
warfare as a means to their ends.  
2 Note the use of “the National Treasury” rather than, say, “the Federal Treasury” or “the United 
States Treasury”. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  41 
However, this sentiment is a “made in America” phenomenon. Pride of place 
must be given to Saint Abraham, in that his statements were made in 1843, a half 
decade before those made by the Father of Communism. 
A  more  modern  follower  of  Lincoln
3  in  this  regard  is  Edwards  (2004) who 
proclaimed:
4 
“Today, under George W. Bush, there are two Americas, not one: One America 
that does the work, another that reaps the reward. One America that pays the taxes, 
another America that gets the tax breaks. One America   middle class America   
whose  needs  Washington  has  long  forgotten,  another  America     narrow interest 
America     whose  every  wish  is  Washington's  command.  One  America  that  is 




3. Early corporate welfare 
 
DiLorenzo (1998, 255, footnote added) avers that, “[t]he political topic that did 
draw most of [Lincoln’s] attention was the economic policy platform of the Whig 
Party,  which  from  1820  until  the  early  1850s  was  literally  defined  by  Lincoln’s 
political idol, Henry Clay.
6  As Johannson (1991) has written, ‘From the moment 
Lincoln first entered political life as a candidate for the state legislature during the 
decisive  1832  presidential  election,  [Lincoln]  had  demonstrated  an  unswerving 
fidelity to the party of Henry Clay and to Clay’s American System, the program of 
internal improvements, protective tariff, and centralized banking’ (14).”  And, “The 
three  main  elements  of  Clay’s  American  System  were  federally  funded  ‘internal 
                                                 
3 This also applies to the prosecutorial side of the Conrad Black law case; a large part of the charges 
against him consist of the complaint that he is a very rich man. Even the media have joined in this 
class  warfare,  characterizing  him  as  a  “media  baron”  (http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2005 
/11/17/black 051117.html).  But  a  baron  was  given  special  political  and  legal  privileges 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baron), something no one even contends is true in this case. A similar 
pattern was responsible for the prosecution of the case against Microsoft; Bill Gates is also very rich. 
See on this Anderson, et al, 2001.  
4 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/articles/A22230 2004Jul28.html 
5  A  sharp  critic  (http://georgiaunfiltered.blogspot.com/2007/07/john edwards two americas400 
haircuts.html) maintains that the real difference between the “two Americas” is that one pays $1250 
for a haircut, and the other only $400. For more on the hairstyling habits of this particular class 
warrior,  see  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18157456/.  According  to  Maclean’s  Magazine  (May  7, 
2007, p. 62): “The man who portrayed himself as a foe of Wall Street didn’t last long as a man of the 
people. In 2005, John Edwards gave a speech railing against ‘two economies in this country: one for 
wealthy insiders and then one for everybody else.’ This week, the Washington Post described how 
Edwards soon went to work for Fortress Investment Group, a fast rising U.S. hedge fun and a tax 
sheltered epitome of the ‘wealthy insider’ economy.” For more class warrior ship see Krugman, 2002, 
for  a  specific  critique  of  Krugman,  see  Coyne,  2002.  For  general  criticism  of  this  doctrine,  see 
DiLorenzo, 2002b; Mises, 1927, 1977; Noonan, 2001. 
6 Although “the economic policy platform of the Whig Party” may have been “literally defined by … 
Henry Clay,” its lineage can be traced back to Hamilton, and his antecedents (Hamilton, 1964 [1791]).  Abraham Lincoln: centralizing class warrior  42 
improvements,’  considered  by  many  to  be  nothing  but  corporate  welfare  for 
steamship, canal, and railroad businesses; high protective tariffs, leading to economic 
autarky;  and  central  banking  and  fiat  money.    In  short  the  Clay Lincoln  system 
consisted of mercantilism, protectionism, the centralization of governmental power, 
and inflationism” (DiLorenzo 1998, 256).   
But  this  was  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg,  historically  speaking,  in  terms  of 
business  socialism.  Hughes  (1977)  and  Horwitz  (1977)  have  demonstrated  that 
business regulation of this sort was hardly begun by Lincoln; it dates back to the very 
founding  of  the  republic.
7  However,  Kolko  (1963,  1970)  has  shown  during  the 
progressive period, hard on the heels of Lincoln’s days of influence, there was a 
significant  upward  ratchet  in  special  privileges  for  well  connected  businessmen. 
Kolko, moreover, gave evidence that large scale capitalists were in the forefront of 
these initiatives: regulations were not promulgated by well meaning politicians and 
civil servants in order to protect consumers against rapacious firms, and then, only 
later,  were  the  regulators  “captured”  (Stigler,  1971,  Peltzman,  1976)  by  business 
interests.  No, these legislative enactments (e.g., the FDA) were set up at the outset at 
the behest of special corporate interests. 
 
4. Public lands 
 
Although most historians maintain that the essence of Clay’s American System 
(CAS)
8 consisted of the tariff, internal improvements, and central banking cum fiat 
money, in fact, there was a fourth main element: public lands policy. The issue of the 
funding of internal improvements was, or became, inextricably bound to the public 
lands policy (itself, inseparable from tariff policy).
9  This requires elucidation. 
The economic nationalists, the centralizers, wanted the “nation” to develop in a 
specific, “balanced” fashion.  The East (New England and the Mid Atlantic States) 
would  be  the  provenance  of  manufacturing  and  commerce,  both  domestic  and 
international.    The  South  and  West  would  provide,  on  the  one  hand,  the  raw 
materials for the factories and the food for labor, and, on the other hand, markets for 
the goods manufactured in the factories.  (Obviously, the South and West would also 
specialize; e g., the South in cotton and the West in grains and livestock.)  The 
sections would  be  tied  together  by  a  system  of  “internal  improvements;”  i.  e., a 
                                                 
7 Rothbard, 2000 traces the rot even further back in time. 
8  Today,  many  refer  to  “Clay’s  American  System”  as  “The  American  System,”  perhaps  rightfully, 
though deplorably, so, because, though it is truly un American in the sense of the principles of the 
War for Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of the United States of 
America, it has come to be the system of America.  Those who deserve major discredit for this turn of 
events  are  far  too  numerous  to  name,  but  to  mention  a  few  presidents,  in  addition  to  Lincoln: 
McKinley, T. Roosevelt, W. Wilson, H. Hoover, F. Roosevelt, L. Johnson, R. Nixon, and W. Clinton. 
9  Peterson,  for  example,  maintains  that  “[i]n  the  theory  of  the  American  System  internal 
improvements should be financed as they were at their inception, by income from the sale of the 
public lands” (Peterson, 1987, 83). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  43 
transportation system.
10  Unfortunately, the Americans would not cooperate with this 
“progressive” central planning.  They were developing their country as free men are 
wont to do – through voluntary interactions with their fellow men.  (Centralizers do 
not  perceive  the  spontaneous  order  that  is  the  natural,  though  unintended, 
consequence of such free market activity; rather, without an order imposed from 
without, as by government, they think that people acting willy nilly in free markets 
cause economic chaos
11). 
CAS, then, was to be the means to the centralizers’ end; and, as such, it was an 
integrated  package.    By  protecting  the  American  market  for  manufactures  from 
foreign  (read  British,  primarily)  competition,  the  tariff  would  promote 
industrialization.    Internal  improvements,  developed  with  governmental  support, 
would link southern and western supplies of agricultural and natural resources, and 
markets  for  manufactured  goods,  to  the  industrial  East.    And,  the  financing  of 
manufacturing would be facilitated by a central bank and fiat money. That would 
provide, directly or indirectly, easy credit for the manufacturers; while the financing 
of internal improvements would be assisted by tariff revenues, net of those necessary 
to  operate  the  federal  government.  The  centralizers’  policy  prescriptions,  as 
embodied  in  CAS,  then,  were  designed  to  affect  their  vision  for  the  U.  S.  
Unfortunately for the centralizers, a major problem developed. 
Essentially, the problem was that the federal government’s receipts exceeded
12 
its  revenue  requirements;  and  that,  despite  the  fact  that  these  requirements were 
increasing.  Virtually all of the federal government’s receipts, from the inception of 
the Union through the first third of the 19
th century, were generated by the tariff and 
the sale of public lands.  In fact, during that period receipts from the tariff, alone, exceeded 
the total expenditures of the federal government by some $8,000,000 (Table 1).  Moreover, 
during the same period, the revenues generated from the sale of public lands, that 
had been dedicated to, and used for, servicing the federal debt,
 13 grew rapidly, and 
exceeded $44,000,000 (Table 1).  The result was that, the debt was repaid to under 
$34  thousand  in  1835  from  a  high  of  over  $127  million  in  1816  (appendix).  
Therefore, the revenue from the sale of public lands became available to the treasury 
to  fund  the  operations  of  the  government.
14    Unless  something was  done,  there 
would be no justification for the prevailing, high tariff rates (Taussig, 1967, Part I). 
 
                                                 
10  This transportation system was to consist of railroads, canals, and steamboats transiting navigable 
rivers; and, “internal improvements” meant the construction of the railroads and canals, and the 
clearing of obstacles to navigation on rivers. 
11 Assuming they are good faith centralizers, and not merely taking such positions for their own 
narrow self interest. 
12 No matter how this may appear to the modern eye, this is not a misprint. 
13 “After the War [of 1812] they [the public lands] were pledged to the payment of the national [sic] 
debt…” (Peterson, 1987, 83). 
14 “… as long as the [public] debt was formidable little thought was given to shaping land policy to 
further the goals of economic development” (Peterson, 1987, 83). Abraham Lincoln: centralizing class warrior  44 
                                                                      Table 1
15 
All data are in 000s of $.   
Period  Total Outlays*
  Total Revenue** Customs 
Revenue 
Revenue from the 
Sale of Public Lands 
1789 1833     615,818     722,103     623,940    44,596 
1834 1860  1,114,949  1,083,634     911,632  130,354 
1789 1860  1,730,767  1,805,737  1,535,572  174,940 
* Includes receipts of the Post Office to the extent they exceeded expenses.   
**
 Includes expenses of the Post Office to the extent they exceeded receipts.   
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957. 
 
This brought to the fore the complex issue of what was to be done with the 
public lands.  Should the terms of their sale be designed to generate revenue or 
promote settlement? And, what should be done with the receipts from such sales?  
On these issues, as well as others, the interests of the East, the West, and the South 
diverged.  Thus, with respect to public lands policy, Peterson (1987, 83, footnotes 
omitted) states: 
 
“There was a broad consensus on the system of disposing of the lands.  (In 
1820 land could be purchased at auction at federal land offices for the minimum 
price  of  $1.25  an  acre  in  the  minimum  quantity  of  eighty  acres.)    This  did  not 
mitigate the continuing tension between the two objects of settlement and revenue.  
Settlement  was  uppermost  in  the  western  mind,  while  revenue  was  the  primary 
concern  in  the  East.    In  the  eyes  of  many  easterners,  above  all  the  economic 
nationalists, public lands were at best a mixed blessing.  They drained off labor and 
capital from the East, where both were wanted for growth of manufactures – indeed, 
for  the  whole  complex  of  arts  and  industries  of  advancing  civilization  –  and 
dispersed them in the slow and exhausting work of frontier development.  Richard 
Rush, Adam’s secretary of treasury, summarized the argument in one of his annual 
[1827] reports: ‘It is a proposition, too plain to require elucidation, that the creation 
of capital is retarded, rather than accelerated, by the diffusion of a thin population 
over a great surface of soil.  Any thing that may serve to hold back this tendency to 
diffusion from racing too far, and too long, into an extreme, can scarcely prove 
otherwise  than  salutary.’    Perhaps  the  most  effective  check  on  this  potentially 
crippling dispersal of national energies was the protective tariff.  The redundant farm 
population in the East, instead of going west and adding to the agricultural surplus, 
would be absorbed into factories and become consumers of that surplus….[a]nother 
means of counteracting the natural pull of the frontier…was a land policy slanted to 
revenue.” 
 
                                                 
15 Annual data for the years 1789 1860 on the series in this table are provided in an appendix. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  45 
And, Frayssé (1988, 104, footnote added) viewed the conflict over public lands 
policy as follows: 
“The  working  class  favored  homestead  legislation,  or,  as  a  last  resort, 
preemption laws.  The ‘old states’ of the East, where there were no longer any public 
lands, favored maintaining the status quo (selling at $1.25 an acre) unless they could 
obtain something in return.  The states of the West favored either distribution of 
public lands (or the product of their sales) to the states in which they were located as 
an encouragement to public works or preemption, which allowed farmers to round 
out their holdings…The South in general had no interest at all in distribution and 
likewise feared preemption, which contributed to the development of the free states 
of the Northwest and their rapid population growth.”
16  
Public lands policy, then, was problematical, at best, for the centralizers.  What 
was wanted was a program that would hamper settlement, while not obviating the 
need for high tariff rates.  Although a number of approaches were broached, most 
amounted to variations on the theme of distribution.  A public lands policy geared to 
revenue  generation  and  the  distribution  thereof  for  the  purpose  of  internal 
improvements would be the ideal solution.  Thus, Baxter (1995, 53) maintains that, 
“… another way to develop transportation involved distribution of proceeds from 
public land sales for this purpose to the states…[it] offered an alternative to direct 
federal involvement, and Clay would tirelessly labor for it the rest of his career.”  
Peterson (1987, 231, footnote omitted, emphasis added) states that:  
“Clay called March 1 [1933] ‘perhaps the most important congressional day that 
ever  occurred.’    It  was  a  personal  triumph,  of  course,  ‘the  most  proud  and 
triumphant day of my life,’ he told Matt Davis.  The House sent the Force Bill, the 
Senate both the Compromise Bill and the Land Bill, to the president for signature.  
The latter was the almost forgotten child of the session.  In December Clay had 
introduced  the  same  measure  the  Senate  had  approved  and  the  House  had 
postponed in the previous session.  Again the Public Lands Committee reported its 
own bill; again, the Senate adopted Clay’s plan for distribution of the proceeds of the 
sale of public lands to the states.  After years of discussion the question was well understood.  
If the income of the Land office was excluded from the revenue to support the [federal] government, 
government would be solely dependent on the tariff, which would tend to perpetuate the American 
System.  Logically,  then,  distribution  was  part  of  the  compromise,  another 
compensatory device, like home valuation, to keep up the tariff.”  
 And, Frayssé (1988, 104, emphasis added) asserted that: 
“The  compromise  law  of  1841  satisfied  no  one.    It  linked  distribution  and 
preemption so as to provide the strict minimum indispensable for the western states, 
but Clay failed in his effort to get the support of the East by linking distribution and 
                                                 
16 Distribution meant the distribution of the revenue obtained from the sale of the public lands to the 
states, primarily for the purpose of funding internal improvements.  Preemption meant laws that 
granted a preemptive right to the title of a limited amount of public lands to those who actually settled 
thereon and improved the land. Abraham Lincoln: centralizing class warrior  46 
the tariff.  On the contrary, distribution would come to an end each time the tariff 
rose above 20 percent.  It became impossible to do what Clay had hoped: to empty the federal 
treasury by distributing the product of the sale of public lands so as to make the increase of customs 
duties inevitable.  Instead, distribution ceased in 1842 as the tariff climbed.”  
Another link between public lands policy and centralization was that distribution 
was also designed to get the states hooked on the Barmecidal sugar teat of federal 
money.
17    President  Jackson  pocket  vetoed  the  Land  Bill.    He  “...now  opposed 
distribution in any form.  Clay’s bill was a ruse for federal support of local internal 
improvements;  it  would  turn  the  states  into  mendicants  of  the  Government  in 
Washington.    ‘A  more  direct  road  to  consolidation  cannot  be  devised,’  Jackson 
declared.  ‘Money is power, and in that Government which pays…will all political 
power be consolidated’ ” (Peterson, 1987, 232, footnote omitted). 
As to Lincoln’s position:  “Lincoln had defined his program clearly during the 
campaign [of 1836].  He favored the distribution of federal lands to the states in 
which they were located in order ‘to dig canals and construct rail roads, without 
borrowing money and paying interest on it.’  Land distribution appeared to be merely 
a means of developing internal improvements, and we shall see that the desire to 
reach that goal would take precedence over all other considerations” (Frayssé, 1988, 
70 71, footnote omitted).   
Frayssé (1988, 77) also states that: 
“Lincoln henceforth [after January 1839] was completely committed to the idea 
that  public  lands  should  serve  exclusively  to  finance  industrial  and  commercial 
development through the intermediary of public works.  He made no further efforts 
to conciliate the interest of squatters, workers, and urban artisans who wanted cheap 
land,  or  if  possible,  free  land with  those  of  public  works  entrepreneurs,  railroad 
companies, and large merchants (who wanted to appropriate the product of the sale 
of the lands in the form of contracts for equipment and commercial profits) or with 
those of large financial creditors of the states and the federal government (who did 
not want to watch placidly as the goods of their debtors were dissipated).”  
We see, then, that the public lands policy was an integral part of CAS, and, as 
one would suspect, Lincoln, following his political hero, Clay, was on the wrong side 
of the issue.  And, it avails naught to point to Lincoln’s homestead policy introduced 
during the War for Southern Independence.  That was strictly an expedient intended 
to aid in the prosecution of the war.  
 
5. The Confederate Constitution 
 
In the view of DiLorenzo (1998, 259): 
“The  Confederate  Constitution  was  essentially  a  carbon  copy  of  the  U.S. 
Constitution, except for the following provisions, all of which dilute the power of the 
central  government  (DeRosa  1992):  protectionist  tariffs  were  unconstitutional; 
                                                 
17 In the current parlous state of the union, the effects of such addiction should be obvious to all. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  47 
government subsidies to private businesses were outlawed; no government funds 
could be spent on ‘internal improvements’ except for dredging rivers and harbors; all 
congressional appropriations required a two thirds majority vote, although a majority 
vote could be held if requested by the president; the president was given a line item 
veto and limited to one six year term; states could initiate constitutional amendments 
but Congress could not; central government officials could be impeached by the state 
legislatures as well as by the House of Representatives; and the general welfare clause 
of the U.S. Constitution was eliminated.”
18 
However, six (6) other significant differences between the two (2) constitutions 
deserve mention.
19  Of these, five (5) did indeed diminished the power of the central 
government but one (1) did augment it. The Constitution of the Confederate States 
of America contained the following provisions. 
First, Article I, Section 8, Clause 7, mandated that the Post Office become self 
sufficient, in very short order: “…but the expenses of the Post Office Department, 
after the first day of March, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and sixty three, 
shall be paid out of its own revenue...”  Given the drain that the Postal Service, nee 
the  Post  Office,  monopoly  has  been  on  the  U.  S.  Treasury  over  the  years,  the 
immense amount of patronage involved in the appointment of postmasters, and the 
vast power of the postal unions, the constraints thereon obviously served the cause 
of liberty. 
Second, Article I, Section 9, Clause 10, prohibited the Congress from entering 
into cost plus contracts, or paying, ex post facto, cost overruns: “All bills appropriating 
money shall specify in Federal currency, the exact amount of each appropriation, and 
the purposes for which it is made; and Congress shall grant no extra compensation to 
any public contractor, officer, agent or servant, after such contract shall have been 
made or such service rendered.”  Given the cost overrun abuses involved in, for 
example, military procurement, such constraints clearly promoted the interests of 
liberty.  
Third, even if, as DiLorenzo implies, the provision in Article I, Section 8, Clause 
1, that: “…no bounties shall be granted by the treasury” applied only to private 
businesses, which interpretation is not necessarily correct, Article I, Section 9, Clause 
10,  also,  apparently,  prohibited  open ended  entitlements,  whether  to  private 
businesses, individuals or states.  This constraint prevented what are perhaps the most 
insidious  destroyers  of  freedom,  the  “free  lunches”  that  enslave  by  inducing 
dependency on governmental largess – in this case dependency of individuals or 
states on largess from the federal government.
20   
Fourth, Article I, Section 9, Clause 20, prohibited “Christmas tree” bills: “Every 
law, or resolution having the force of law, shall relate to but one subject, and that 
                                                 
18 The Constitution of the CSA can be found at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/csa/csa.htm. 
19  This,  obviously,  ignores  differences  relating  to  slavery,  though  such  differences  between  the 
Confederate Constitution of 1861 and the Union Constitution as it stood in 1861 were not so great as 
many might think. 
20 On this point, see the text associated with footnote 12. Abraham Lincoln: centralizing class warrior  48 
shall be expressed in the title.”  By restraining “logrolling,” this constraint advanced 
the interests of liberty.  
Fifth,  Article  II,  Section  2,  Clause,  4,  prohibited  recess  appointments  of 
nominees who had been rejected by the senate: “… but no person rejected by the 
Senate shall be reappointed to the same office during their ensuing recess.”  Had the 
U. S. Constitution such a provision, perhaps we would have been spared Bill Lan Lee 
at “Justice” (Thomas, 1999).  In any case, this provision restrained the power of the 
president, a desideratum of a society of free people.  
Sixth, Article I, Section 9, Clause 6, allowed tariffs to be placed on exports by a 
two thirds  (2/3)  vote  of  both  Houses:  “No  tax  or  duty  shall  be  laid  on  articles 
exported from any State, except by a vote of two thirds of both Houses.” This is the 
single provision that augmented the central government’s power. 
The South, vis a vis the North, has a reputation for backwardness, sloth, for 
being uncivilized. However, at least with regard adherence to the strictures of private 
property, economic freedom and free enterprise, it is difficult to see how such an 




In sum, we have offered a strong indictment of “Honest Abe” as “The Great 
Centralizer.”  DiLorenzo (1998, tba) is directly on target when he states that, “The 
South’s  defeat  and  subjugation  radically  changed  the  very  nature  of  American 
government from a decentralized, federal system to a consolidated national system 
and effectively destroyed local sovereignty as an effective check on the centralizing 




Table 1: Annual series: total expenditures; total receipts; customs receipts; &, receipts from sales of public lands. 
Series #  Y 255  Y 259  Y 260  Y 263    Y 255  Y 259  Y 260  Y 263 






















1789 91  4,269  4,419  4,399     1826  17,036  25,260  23,341  1,394 
1792  5,080  3,670  3,443     1827  16,139  22,966  19,712  1,496 
1793  4,482  4,653  4,255     1828  16,395  24,764  23,206  1,018 
1794  6,991  5,432  4,801     1829  15,203  24,828  22,682  1,517 
1795  7,540  6,115  5,588     1830  15,143  24,844  21,922  2,329 
1796  5,727  8,378  6,568  5  1831  15,248  28,527  24,224  3,211 
1797  6,134  8,689  7,550  84  1832  17,289  31,866  28,465  2,623 
1798  7,677  7,900  7,106  12  1833  23,018  33,948  29,033  3,968 
Series #  Y 255  Y 259  Y 260  Y 263    Y 255  Y 259  Y 260  Y 263 
1799  9,666  7,547  6,610     1834  18,628  21,792  16,215  4,858 
1800  10,786  10,849  9,081  0.5>  1835  17,573  35,430  19,391  14,758 Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 2  49 
1801  9,395  12,935  10,751  168  1836  30,868  50,827  23,410  24,877 
1802  7,862  14,996  12,438  189  1837  37,243  24,954  11,169  6,776 
1803  7,852  11,064  10,479  166  1838  33,865  26,303  16,159  3,082 
1804  8,719  11,826  11,099  488  1839  26,899  31,483  23,138  7,076 
1805  10,506  13,561  12,936  540  1840  24,318  19,480  13,500  3,293 
1806  9,804  15,560  14,668  765  1841  26,566  16,860  14,487  1,366 
1807  8,354  16,398  15,846  466  1842  25,206  19,796  18,188  1,336 
1808  9,932  17,061  16,364  648  1843  11,858  8,303  7,047  898 
1809  10,281  7,773  7,296  442  1844  22,338  29,321  26,184  2,060 
1810  8,157  9,384  8,583  697  1845  22,937  29,970  27,528  2,077 
1811  8,058  14,424  13,313  1,040  1846  27,767  29,700  26,713  2,694 
1812  20,281  9,801  8,959  710  1847  57,281  26,496  23,748  2,498 
1813  31,682  14,340  13,225  836  1848  45,377  35,736  31,757  3,329 
1814  34,721  11,182  5,999  1,136  1849  45,052  31,208  28,347  1,689 
1815  32,708  15,729  7,283  1,288  1850  39,543  43,603  39,669  1,860 
1816  30,587  47,678  36,307  1,718  1851  47,709  52,559  49,018  2,352 
1817  21,844  33,099  26,283  1,991  1852  44,195  49,847  47,339  2,043 
1818  19,825  21,585  17,176  2,607  1853  48,184  61,587  58,932  1,667 
1819  21,464  24,603  20,284  3,274  1854  58,045  73,800  64,224  8,471 
1820  18,261  17,881  15,006  1,636  1855  59,743  65,351  53,026  11,497 
1821  15,811  14,573  13,004  1,213  1856  69,571  74,057  64,023  8,918 
1822  15,000  20,232  17,590  1,804  1857  67,796  68,965  63,876  3,829 
1823  14,707  20,541  19,088  917  1858  74,185  46,655  41,790  3,514 
1824  20,327  19,381  17,878  984  1859  69,071  53,486  49,566  1,757 
1825  15,857  21,841  20,099  1,216  1860  63,131  56,065  53,188  1,779 
Source:  Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957, pp. 
711 712. 
 
Notes to table 1. 
1.  The receipts and expenditures of the Post Office are netted and the net 
included in total receipts or total expenditures as the net is positive or negative, 
respectively.  
 2.  There are two series for “Total gross debt:” 1) Y 257 (pg. 711) noted “as of 
end of period;” and, “Y 368 (pg. 721), that do not agree with each other.  There is a 
one year shift in the data, such that the same datum that is given for year t debt in the 
Y 257 series is also given for the year t+1 debt in the Y 368 series, except that in the 
Y 257 series the years 1789 1791 are combined, whereas in Y 368 series the datum is 
given for 1791, but not for either 1789 or 1790.  The Y 368 series data do agree with 
the  U.  S.  Treasury  Dept.  series  at:  http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/ 
opd.opdhisto1.htm, except for 1835. 
3.    The  series  for  the  annual  surplus  or  deficit,  Y256  (pg.  711)  is  correctly 
calculated from the receipts and expenditures data.  However, this series is inconsistent 
with the increments to the total gross debt, regardless of which series is used. 
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